Volume 48

Number 4

Article 3

June 2020

Memory in Christian Education: Reflections on Book X of St.
Augustine's Confessions
Terry Kleven

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Higher Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Kleven, Terry (2020) "Memory in Christian Education: Reflections on Book
X of St. Augustine's Confessions," Pro Rege: Vol. 48: No. 4, 26 - 32.
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol48/iss4/3

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Digital Collections
@ Dordt. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Digital Collections @
Dordt. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Kleven presented this paper at the Prodigal Love of God Conference, April 2019, in celebration of the
400th anniversary of the Canons of Dort, sponsored by Dordt University and co-sponsored by the Lilly Fellowship Program,
as a regional conference. He originally presented aspects of the paper at the Thirty-Eighth Annual Atlantic Theological
Conference on June 24th–27th, 2018, St. Paul’s Church, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada

Memory in Christian
Education and Liturgy:
Reflections on Book X of St.
Augustine’s Confessions

by Terence Kleven
“Late have I loved you, beauty so
old and so new: late have I loved you.”
St. Augustine, Confessions, Book X 27, 38
I
Introduction – Memory in the Bible
The purpose of this essay is to address a topic which, in my critical judgment, is crucial to
Dr. Terence Kleven is Professor of the Department of
Philosophy and Religion at Central College, Pella, Iowa, and
Priest-in-Charge at St. James’ Episcopal Church, Oskaloosa,
Iowa. He is also currently a Visiting Professor at the Max
Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin.

26

Pro Rege—June 2020

Christian theology and Christian education, namely, the significance of memory. My aim is to explain
the central place that memory has in the Christian’s
journey to God both in Scriptural teaching and in
the theological reflections of one of the most renowned of the Church Fathers, St. Augustine. In
an age such as ours, which is dominated by the generally-accepted opinion that we are progressing into
the future, remembrance of what has been true—
and may always be true—can be often overlooked
or even considered a problem that needs to be overcome. If, however, these biblical and Augustinian
accounts of the importance of memory in Christian
teaching cannot be ignored—to say nothing in this
essay of the need for an appreciation of memory
in humanistic education generally—we may need
to reflect anew on the place of memory in our understanding of faith. The way in which we teach
the young, whether at home, in school, in colleges
and universities, or through the types of liturgy we
use for individual and common prayers, may only
be revived if we are guided by our understanding
of the faculty of memory in the soul. Augustine’s
analysis of memory in the attainment of knowledge
in Book X of his book the Confessions is a forceful
account which influenced various writers throughout the Medieval Period and the Reformation, and
its epistemological significance only began to be
replaced with the empirical tradition instituted by
T. Hobbes, F. Bacon, and J. Locke in the seven-

teenth century, as part III of this essay indicates.
Thus, our evaluation of Christian theology, both
Medieval and Reformed, will require reflection on
Augustine’s account.1
Given the title of this conference, I could not
help but notice that the Gospel lesson for the Fourth
Sunday in Lent, that is, for last Sunday, according
to the use of the Revised Common Lectionary, is
the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32). It
may well have been by design that this conference
received its title because the organizers were aware
that this parable would be fresh on our minds. This
“prodigal,” or lavish, even perhaps scandalously lavish, sense of God’s mercy is, it would seem, the rationale for the title of the conference, even as the
parable shows the lavish love of the father for the
son. But the lavish love is also a response to another
element in the parable, namely, the repentance of
the son; this Gospel lesson is quite appropriate for
this season of Lent because the parable is about repentance, and also, to be sure, about rejoicing in
the repentance, rejoicing in the lavish mercy of the
father toward the repentant son. The most common Hebrew word in the Old Testament for repentance is the word šûb (bWv), to return. For example,
the prophet Hosea says in 3:5, “Afterward, shall the
children of Israel return (yāšubû, Wbuv'y) and seek the
Lord their God, and David their king; and shall
fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days.”
Repentance is a going back, a motion of the soul
and body to acknowledge and to recover what was
lost. Perhaps what was lost was given away, or perhaps just neglected, or as in the parable, prodigally
or lavishly wasted. Yet even if repentance is not and
perhaps cannot be a recovery of the goods that were
squandered, it is a recovery of a relationship with
the father. We can say that in the parable, there
is no progress in the relationship without return,
which is why the Hebrew word for repentance is the
word šûb. The prodigal son’s return is the indication of his repentance.
The Old Testament lesson that is paired in the
Revised Common Lectionary with the Parable of
the Prodigal’s Son is Joshua 5:9-12, a portion of
text describing some of the first acts of the children
of Israel as Joshua leads them through the Jordan
River. These verses tell us that the children of Israel
keep the Passover in this land of Canaan, the land

promised to Abraham just about six hundred years
previously. The Passover is a “memorial” (wAr'KZI ,
zikārôn), as it says in Ex. 12:14, a feast to be kept so
that the community will not forget what wonderful
works God had done for them. In a few verses prior
to this lection from Joshua 5, the Israelites select
twelve representatives, one from each of the twelve
tribes, who each take a stone from the river bed of
the Jordan to place in a pile as a “sign” (tAa, ’ ôt) and
“memorial” (zikārôn) of this entry into the land
(Josh. 4:6-7). Joshua writes, “When your children
shall ask their fathers in time to come, saying, What
mean these stones? Then ye shall let your children
know, saying, Israel came over this Jordan on dry
land” (Josh. 4:21-22). In addition, the men who
crossed over this day were born in the Wilderness
and had their own reasons for remembering, for
circumcision had not been practiced in the desert,
and it is instituted here at Gilgal for the first time in
forty years (Josh. 5:2-9). The males would not forget Gilgal. The Israelites were returning to the land
of Canaan, not that this specific group had been in
Canaan, but their ancestors had come from there.
In various ways, they are to remember the return of
the nation to the land and, in doing so, to remember the wondrous deeds of God for the nation both
in the past and now in the present. To return to
the land ends the punishment for the hardheartedness of the Wilderness generation, ends the remembrance of the need for repentance. As they return to
the land, the signs and memorials are to be established which they will use to remember the events
of this day in the future. And if we consider again
briefly the Parable of the Prodigal Son and notice
what Luke writes at the moment of recognition
of the prodigal son’s change, we read, “and when
he came to himself, he said (eis heauton de elthōn
ephē, εὶς ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἐλθὼν ἔφη)” (vs. 17). This is a
similar expression in both Greek and English, the
English rhetoric being formed by the Greek, which
indicates that something has been lost that needs to
return; he needs to find himself again, to remember
himself again, to remember that the servants of his
father are better off than he. He remembers, and he
returns, and he repents. These ideas, in scriptural
sensibility, are concomitant. In Scripture, faithfulness is close to remembrance, and forgetfulness is
close to unbelief. The lavish, the prodigal, love of
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God is concurrent with the human need to remember and, in remembering, to return. In these few
but striking examples in Scripture, lavish mercy
depends upon repentance, which in turn depends
upon remembrance.
II
Augustine on Memory in Book X
Book X of St. Augustine’s Confessions is entitled
“Memory.” The chapter is perhaps the most deeply
introspective of the entire book. In the chapter,
Augustine begins by describing the motives for
confession. He asks himself how he knows God.
He seeks this knowledge initially through God’s
creatures, from the earth to the heavens, but they
all declare to him that he should love God rather
than them, for they are signs; they indicate that
knowledge of him through themselves is not sufficient. Augustine then asks,
Then towards myself I turned, and asked myself, “Who are you?” And I answered my own
question: “A man.” See, here are the body and
soul that make up myself, the one outward
and the other within. Through which of these
should I seek my God? With my body’s senses I
had already sought him from earth to heaven, to
the farthest place whither I could send the darting rays of my eyes; but what lay within me was
better, and to this all those bodily messengers
reported back, for it controlled and judged the
replies of sky and earth, and of all the creatures
dwelling in them, all those who had proclaimed,
“We are not God” and “He made us.” My inner self recognized them all through the service
of the outer. I who was the inmost self, I, who
was mind, knew them through the senses of my
body; and so I questioned the vast frame of the
world concerning my God, and it answered, “I
am not he, but he made me” (6, 9).2

“But what lay within me was better,” he says in
this quotation; and in the next section he says, “By
this same soul I will mount to him” rather than
through the creatures in the world. Reason is able
to teach Augustine that the images of the creatures
of God are surpassed by “what lay within.”
At this point we might expect Augustine to
elaborate on his account of the relation between the
28
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senses and the mind in his ascent to God. We know
from earlier parts of the Confessions that it is the
very existence of mathematics, the incorporeal abstractions of mathematics, that convince him that
the materialism of the Manichaeans is bogus. The
recognition of incorporeality had already been recognized by Augustine but is not this truth to which
he turns in the argument. At this point in Book X,
he turns to memory. In memory, he says, “there I
come to meet myself” (8, 14).3 He is amazed at the
vast resources of memory; in fact, he says they are
“exceedingly great, a vast, infinite recess” (8, 15).4
He says we may travel far to see high mountains
and crashing waterfalls and so on, but we are able
in an instant to recall these in memory. And when
we ask whether something exists, or what it is, or
what qualities it has, we may have sensory images
of them, but we do not grasp the thing only with
images of these attributes. He says “But through
no bodily sense whatever have I made contact with
the realities themselves, for I have never seen these
realities anywhere except in my own mind (neque
ullo sensu corporis attigi neque uspiam vidi praeter
animum meum)” (10,17).5 It is these things themselves, not images of them, that are stored up in
memory. He continues,
What I have stowed away in my memory is
not the images of these things but the things
themselves. Let them say how they found their
way into me if they can, for when I check every
physical gateway in myself I find none by which
they can have entered. My eyes tell me, “If those
things were colored, it was we who reported
them”; my ears declare, “If they made some
sound, we gave you the information”; [and so
on for the five senses]. From what source and
by what route did they [the things themselves]
enter my memory? I do not know, for when
I learned them I did not take them on trust
from some stranger’s intelligence but recognized them as present in my own, and affirmed
them as true, and entrusted them to my memory for safekeeping so that I could bring them
out again when I wished. This means that they
were there even before I learned them, but not
remembered. Where and why did I recognize
them and say, “Yes, that’s how it is; that is true,”
when these things were stated? Surely because
they were already in my memory, but so remote,

so hidden from sight in concealed hollows, that
unless they had been dug out by someone who
reminded me, I would perhaps never have been
able to think about them (10,17).6

and are not actually new. As they are pulled out,
they are, he says,
… herded together to become knowable once
more: that is to say they need to be collected
again, which is why we call this activity cogitating, or collecting one’s thoughts. Cogo is related
to cogito as ago is to agito and facio to factito. The
mind, however, has claimed this verb [cogito] as
properly applicable to itself, so that only what
is “collected,” within the mind, what is “herded
together” there, and there only, is properly said
to be “thought” (11, 18).10

The “things themselves,” as is translated here by
Maria Boulding, or as she translates elsewhere, the
“realities themselves,” are not simply sense images
even if the categories of their corporeal being—
quantity, quality, place, relation and so on—are
images from our senses; they themselves are other than that. Chadwick’s
translation will use both
Those “things” are that
“realities” and “ideas” as the
Augustine uses Latin
subject in this context, terms
stem variations to elucidate
which the memory already
his point. Cogo is the verb
which also assert that these
held independently of sense
are things in themselves and
to collect; cogito is derivative
perception.
are not identical to sense
from cogo and is the verb
7
Someone
such
perceptions.
to think. The parallels with
as a teacher or the speeches from a book may be
other verbs with similar derivative forms assist
necessary to be the catalyst to dig them out of the
Augustine’s philological point. Ago is the verb to put
concealed hollows of our memory; yet the exterin motion, move; agito is a derivative stem verb to set
nal agent will do nothing more than remind us of
in violent motion, drive onward. Agito is an intensifiwhat is there rather than add anything new. For
cation of ago, a meaning that is achieved in English
Augustine, the mind is no tabula rasa but a vast,
with the use of the adverb violent. Facio is the verb
even infinite, recess of realities awaiting to be awakto make, to construct; factitio is a derivative stem verb
ened through memory.8
to do frequently, do habitually. The derivative stem is
In the next section he writes,
also an intensification of the verb, a meaning again
in English that is achieved through an adverb, in
We are therefore led to conclude that when we
this case with the idea of frequency. Augustine thus
learn things which are not imbibed through the
demonstrates that the verb cogo is the stem verb and
senses as images, but are known directly in their
cogito is a derivative stem verb; however, the meanown reality inside the mind, as they are in theming of cogito is not to be understood as an intensiselves, and without the intervention of images,
fication or continuation, as is the case with these
we are collecting by means of our thought those
other two stem variations, because something qualthings which the memory already held, but in
itatively different is intended between collecting and
a scattered and disorderly way. By applying our
thinking. Augustine says the mind has claimed the
minds to them we ensure that they are stacked
ready-to-hand in the memory, where they may
derivative verb stem cogito and given it a meaning
be easily available for habitual use, instead of lyqualitatively other than intensification or continuing hidden, dispersed and neglected, as hitherto
ation. Thus, although the pattern between the cog(11, 18).9
nate stems is identical among the three sets of verbs,
Those “things” are that which the memory alcogito means to think rather than to collect hurriedly
ready held independently of sense perception. As
or to collect vigorously, that is, with some type of
these things are recalled to the memory, we can say
intensification. Yet, we ought to credit cogo, collectthat we learn them because this is what learning is,
ing, as an intellectual process; it is the initial process
nothing else. When we wish to recall them again,
which prepares for and will pass into thinking. The
we may need to pull them from the places as if they
mind comes to think by collecting, or in the shepare being newly thought out, but they are present
herding metaphor of herding together, and what is
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this collecting but the remembering of what is in the
mind. To learn, for Augustine, is to remember, and
learning will not take place without remembering.
At this point (12, 19) Augustine uses the argument from mathematics, an argument that is
not used for the first time here in the Confessions.
The laws of mathematics, he says, have no color,
nor sound, nor smell nor can they be tasted nor
touched. The stated laws may sound one way in
Greek and another in Latin, but these sounds are
not the laws; he says “the mathematical lines they
represent are something quite different, not the images of the lines which my fleshly eye has observed”
(12,19).11 And in the same context, he says, “The
principle [of number] is not an image of the things
counted, and therefore has a much more real existence” (12, 19).12 Memory is more than a repository
of sense perceptions which we recall when we are
able. The incorporeal, mathematical realities are in
the memory, and learning is to bring them to recollection. Augustine proceeds in the next section to
affirm the importance of this recognition. He says
that mind and memory are the same: “the person
who remembers is myself; I am my mind (ego sum,
qui memini, ego animus)” (14, 21).13 There is no
mind without memory. Memory is not some portion of the mind which the mind uses or does not
use as it sees fit. Without the operations of memory,
there can be no science, no scientia, whether the science be natural philosophy, theology, or the reading
of the narrative, legal texts, or parables of Scripture.
III
Memory, Education and Liturgy
in Our Context
It is not difficult to contrast this Augustinian
account with that of the empirical tradition of the
early seventeenth century. In the opening sections
of Part I of Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, it takes little
time at all for Hobbes to dispense with thoughts
not derived from senses and to diminish the importance of memory for knowledge because they
are only weakened and decaying sense perceptions.14 If ever-new sense perceptions are what matter, why settle for decaying percepts in the memory.
Hobbes’s stated opponent is Aristotle. In Chapter
I, “Of Sense,” Hobbes says “The Originall of them
30
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all [by which he means thoughts], is that which we
call Sense; (For there is no conception in a mans
[sic] mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by
parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The
rest are derived from the originall.”15 In Chapter 2,
“Of Imagination,” Hobbes says that it is due to the
transitoriness of our lives that our memories are
dim. I quote:
… our imagination of the Past is weak; and
wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen,
many particular Streets; and of Actions, many
particular Circumstances. This decaying sense,
when wee would express the thing it self, (I
mean fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I
said before: but when we would express the decay, and signify that the Sense is fading, old and
past, it is called Memory. So that the Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for
divers considerations hath divers names.16

Even though in Augustine, memories may be
hidden and tucked away in crevices, they are not
fading, old, past, and decaying. They wait, unchanged and unchangeable, ever to be recalled.
With Hobbes the empirical tradition is upon us,
and memory is of little consequence. External sensation is all.
In regard to education, the emphasis of the empirical tradition will be on what comes to us by way
of the senses and is in contrast to the guidance we
gain from Augustine. According to the empirical
tradition, these sensations need to be always refreshed to capture and satisfy our interests because
they can and do decay as they exist as imaginings
and memories. The aims of Hobbes’s account of
science and of education will inevitably be on the
outward rather than inward, and the interiority of
Augustine’s account of knowledge is dismissed. In
Hobbes’s opinion of education, a lot depends on the
teacher and the external stimuli. In Augustine, in
contrast, education is focused on the inward, upon
a recognition that the teacher does not create what
is remembered, but points it out as already there in
one’s thought and above all allows the individual
to awaken himself or herself, perhaps in the manner of the prodigal son, “when he came to himself.”
Augustine’s strategy would not lead to a dizzying
practice of learning by rote because that would be

close to the notion that the process is primarily exmaturity of theology and richness of phraseology,
ternal, something impressed upon the student from
collected from phrases of Scripture, may not be
the outside, perhaps by a frustrated teacher. For
immediately understood upon first acquaintance,
Augustine, reading and study, including observaespecially if we are young. But they will become
tion, in order to create an ease of familiarity would
familiar, will be remembered and recollected, and
be closer to the mark of what learning should look
shape and guide us more deeply, I think, than
like. For Augustine, the process of learning would
Joshua’s stones.
require us to read, then close the book, and recolBut there is also a shift away from spiritual forlect in tranquility the math problem, the process
mation in the accounts of education based upon
we witnessed in nature, or the plot of the novel.
the empiricism of such writers as Hobbes. There is a
Learning for Augustine respects the faculties and
movement away from the language of well-written
intelligence of the student
texts, which are used with
rather than relying upon the
sufficient frequency so that
The ascent to God through
external stimulation of the
they are known by large
teacher. Augustine would be
numbers of the congregamind, that is, through
apt to say to a student, ‘Look
tion regardless of education
memory, is the journey
what you already know?’ or
level and vocation in life,
we have too prodigally
‘Do you remember what we
to
spontaneously-created
squandered
and
to
which
we
recognized previously?’
prayers and “orders” of serAugustine’s account at
vice whose guiding principle
need to return to in order to
least historically has had a
is variety or innovation. If
find our true home.
positive impact on educaAugustine is correct that “I
tion in the Church, espeam my mind” and “Mind is
cially through the liturgy. Augustine’s account in
memory,” we need to ponder indeed whether mind
Book X of cogo and cogito, of collecting and thinking,
is really more in existence in our post-Hobbesian
explains the long-standing use in the prayers of the
context than in a world shaped by Augustine, or
Church of what we still call “collects.” Collects are
if in fact what Hobbes leaves us with is some trunthose short prayers, often at the beginning of our
cated version of mind. And if too, as Augustine asprayers and at the end, which gather, or herd togethserts, memory is the way in which the soul ascends
er, our thoughts so that we can be led to cogitation,
to God, our diminishment of memory separates us
to knowing. The herding together, or collecting, of
from this most beneficial and beautiful ascent to
our thoughts depends on familiarity gained over
the Good.
time, familiarity based on memory, and reawakened regularly in our daily, weekly, and seasonal
IV
liturgies. Christian formation of character, spiritual
Recapitulation
and moral, if indeed Augustine is correct—and in
my critical judgment he seems closer than the alI began this study with reflections on bibliternatives—will require memory. No minister or
cal texts in order to draw attention to the signifipriest has been in the presence of a dying person
cance of memory in biblical sensibility; memory
whose intellectual sensibilities are failing without
in Scripture is close to the notion of faithfulness.
recognizing that the deepest memories, such as
Even as Israel was expected to look at those memothose of the Lord’s Prayer, Psalm 23, and of hymns
rial stones piled up on the side of the river, stones
or psalms sung to plainsong or the Genevan Psalter,
which had been rounded off from years of floware the last connections with this world to be lost.
ing water over them when they lay in the river
These deepest recollections are also entrances to
bed of the Jordan, so we are to recognize that in
the world of light. To push the argument further,
remembrance of the wondrous events depicted in
how can these collects of the Church be understood
Scripture, in the sacraments, and in God’s presence
without Augustine’s account of memory? Their
in us, we can ascend in the knowledge of God. The
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way in which we can find ourselves, as the prodigal
son did, is through memory. We can, like him, return, repent, and learn the meaning of knowledge
and rejoicing. The ascent to God through mind,
that is, through memory, is the journey we have
too prodigally squandered and to which we need to
return to in order to find our true home. Christian
liturgy, which ought to be the best words in the
best order for the best herding, or collecting together,
of our recollections, remains a vital way forward for
the rediscovery of what has been there for and in us
all the time. As Augustine writes in this chapter on
memory, “Late have I loved you, beauty so old and
so new: Late have I loved you.” It took memory for
Augustine to realize that beauty was ever old and
ever new.
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